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Reductionism ad absurdum
Attneave and Dennett cannot reduce
Homunculus (and hence the mind)
Lance Nizami
Independent Research Scholar, Palo Alto, California, USA
Abstract
Purpose – Neuroscientists act as proxies for implied anthropomorphic signal-processing beings within the
brain, Homunculi. The latter examine the arriving neuronal spike-trains to infer internal and external states.
But a Homunculus needs a brain of its own, to coordinate its capabilities – a brain that necessarily contains a
Homunculus and so on indeﬁnitely. Such inﬁnity is impossible – and in well-cited papers, Attneave and later
Dennett claim to eliminate it. How do their approaches differ and do they (in fact) obviate the Homunculi?
Design/methodology/approach – The Attneave and Dennett approaches are carefully scrutinized. To
Attneave, Homunculi are effectively “decision-making” neurons that control behaviors. Attneave presumes
that Homunculi, when successively nested, become successively “stupider”, limiting their numbers by
diminishing their responsibilities. Dennett likewise postulates neuronal Homunculi that become “stupider” –
but brain-wards, where greater sophisticationmight have been expected.
Findings – Attneave’s argument is Reductionist and it simply assumes-away the Homuncular inﬁnity.
Dennett’s scheme, which evidently derives from Attneave’s, ultimately involves the same mistakes. Attneave
and Dennett fail, because they attempt to reduce intentionality to non-intentionality.
Research limitations/implications – Homunculus has been successively recognized over the
centuries by philosophers, psychologists and (some) neuroscientists as a crucial conundrum of cognitive
science. It still is.
Practical implications – Cognitive-science researchers need to recognize that Reductionist explanations
of cognition may actually devolve to Homunculi, rather than eliminating them.
Originality/value – Two notable Reductionist arguments against the inﬁnity of Homunculi are proven
wrong. In their place, a non-Reductionist treatment of the mind, “Emergence”, is discussed as a means of
rendering Homunculi irrelevant.
Keywords Brain, Homunculus, Neuron, Reductionism, Attneave, Dennett
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In an earlier work in Kybernetes, Nizami (2015) examines how neuroscientists interpret
Shannon’s “general communication system”, the basis for Shannon Information Theory.
Nizami demonstrates that Shannon overlooks a crucial element that is implied to be in his
system, namely, the observer, a concept of great importance to Second-Order Cybernetics.
Shannon’s system is symmetric; that is, its “reception” side is a mirror-image of its
“transmission” side. But there is no “reception” side in a research animal’s brain. Whatever
neuroscientists imagine as Shannon’s “signal”, such as a train of neuronal voltage-spikes
(reviewed in Nizami, 2017), is not converted back to a “message” (the communications-
engineering operation called “decoding”). In fact, it is neuroscientists who act as Shannon’s
My thanks to Claire S. Barnes PhD for her insights. Some arguments from the present paper
appeared in rougher form in Nizami (2014b) and Nizami (2016). I sincerely thank the two anonymous
Reviewers for their thought-provoking advice.
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missing observer(s), performing “decoding” within the laboratory. The neuroscientists
thereby act as proxies for implied anthropomorphic signal-processing beings within the
animal’s brain – the Homunculi. Nizami (2015) re-describes the concept of the Homunculus
and brieﬂy summarizes two schemes that claim to rationalize-away the Homunculi, namely
those of Attneave (1961) and of Dennett (1981). Nizami (2015) notes that the latter paper
apparently derives from the former and that the former paper is wrong. But Nizami (2015)
omitted the proof, for lack of space. That proof is now supplied, along with an exploration of
the underlying Reductionism of Attneave (1961) and of Dennett (1981), which ﬁrst
necessitated the proof. Finally, an alternative way of thinking about Homunculi is advanced,
which allows the elimination of Homunculi altogether. These issues continue to be timely;
hence, all are discussed using the “present tense”.
First: who is Homunculus? Neuroscientists and philosophers portray Homunculus as a
miniature copy of its host, living within each host’s head without the host’s awareness.
Homunculus has a long history. René Descartes (quoted in Kenny, 1971, p. 66) warned against
believing in the “visual Homunculus”, who “sees” images for us within the brain, a notion now
known as the “Cartesian theater”. What is allegedly seen by Homunculus are the neuronal
voltage spikes that arrive at the host’s brain, some from sensory receptors which interact with
the external world (eyes, ears, skin, nose, mouth), some from internal sensor cells that interact
with the internal world (the world of blood carbon dioxide, blood oxygen, muscle tension, etc.).
Homunculus uses the incoming spikes to infer the state of the external and internal worlds.
Note that the Homunculus itself (henceforth called the Prime Homunculus) seemingly
needs legs (or their equivalents), to roam the brain; arms, to isolate particular neurons and
eyes, to observe spike ﬁring. To coordinate these capabilities – and to remember the
observations, to better “discriminate” between stimuli in the future – Homunculus needs a
brain of its own. But such a brain needs its own internal Homunculus, likewise to perform
“computations” (as the literature often states) on behalf of the previous Homunculus. An
inﬁnity of “nested”Homunculi is necessitated. Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁrst few nestings.
An inﬁnite regression of Homunculi can be unwittingly called-upon elsewhere in the
nervous system, not just at the brain. For example, an inﬁnite Homuncular regression lies
hidden within sensory receptors (such as inner hair cells of the ear or retinal cells of the eye), in
an allegedly Information-Theory-based multi-paper account of perception authored by K.H.
Norwich. This Homunculus error is revealed in Nizami (2009a) and further criticism appears in
Kybernetes (Nizami, 2011, 2013) and in other cybernetics journals (Nizami, 2009b, 2010, 2012a).
An inﬁnity of Homunculi is absurd; experiencing any [internal or external] stimulus
might require inﬁnities of time and/or energy. Therefore, the number of successive nestings
must be ﬁnite – or, better yet, Homunculus must be eliminated entirely. Two famous
Homunculus-removal schemes exist, to which citations appear daily: Attneave (1961) and
Dennett (1981), in books that are still in print. As Newell (1980, p. 715) notes (original
internal quotation marks):
A major item on the agenda of cognitive psychology is to banish the homunculus (i.e., the
assumption of an intelligent agent (little man) residing elsewhere in the system, usually oﬀ stage,
who does all the marvelous things that need to be done actually to generate the total behavior of the
subject) [. . .] who is renamed the “executive” in many models.
Baddeley (1998) in fact claims credit for the so-called “central executive” (citing Baddeley
and Hitch, 1974). Regardless, Newell’s (1980) remarks remain true.
Schinkel (2006), Drayson (2012), Rose (2012) and Boone and Piccinini (2016) all attempt to
banish Homunculi and all refer speciﬁcally and uncritically to the Homunculus-limiting
schemes of both Attneave (1961) and Dennett (1981). Other authors agree uncritically with
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Attneave (1961) but fail to cite Dennett (1981) (Sanders, 1998; Crick and Koch, 2000; Posner
and DiGirolamo, 2000; Crick and Koch, 2003; Mumford, 2003; Baddeley, 2012; Woodman
and Schroeder, 2012). Yet other authors fail to mention Attneave (1961), but agree (perhaps
reluctantly) with Dennett (1981) (Monsell and Driver, 2000; Verbruggen et al., 2014). Other
writers cite neither Attneave nor Dennett, but nonetheless recognize that “the notion of a
central executive [that controls the selection of actions and cognitive functions more
generally] is tantamount to positing a homunculus (small man)” (Hazy et al., 2007, p. 1601),
hence there being a need “to deconstruct this implicit homunculus” (Hazy et al., p. 1609).
Numerous other citations could be mentioned.
The schemes of Attneave (1961) and of Dennett (1981) will be presently synopsized and
will be found faulty.
2. According to Attneave (1961): a ﬁnite number of Homunculi
2.1 Attneave’s verbal description
Attneave (1961) allegedly obviates the inﬁnite regression of Homunculi and inﬂuential
researchers have believed him (Crick and Koch, 2000, 2003). Indeed, the book Sensory
Communication (reprinted in 2012), in which Attneave’s work appears, has long been a
standard reference-work in Cognitive Science. Altogether, Attneave (1961) must not be ignored.
Attneave (1961, p. 778) begins as follows: “If a homunculus exists it must certainly be
composed of neurons”. Hence, “We fall into a regress only if we try to make the homunculus
do everything” (Attneave, p. 778; original italics). Further (Attneave, p. 778; original italics):
The moment we specify certain processes that occur outside the homunculus, we are merely
classifying or partitioning psychoneural [sic] functions; the classiﬁcation may be crude, but it is
not in itself regressive.
Figure 1.
The inﬁnity of
Homunculi (see text)
Reductionism
ad absurdum
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He continues (Attneave, p. 778):
Indeed, one might even hypothesize a series of concentric or nested homunculi without falling into
a regress, provided each contained an outer layer of functions not contained in the next
smaller one.
Attneave (1961) then borrows from Bullock (1961). That is, Attneave (1961, p. 778, original
internal quotation marks) proposes that:
For any given behavior there must be at least one neuron that “decides”, on the basis of activity in
receptors and other neurons, whether to initiate that behavior or not.
Consequently “There may be as many ‘homunculi’ of this sort as there are coherent behavior
patterns” (Attneave, p. 778; original internal quotation marks).
Attneave (1961) strongly implies that his “psychoneural functions” (see above) are either
behaviors or, operationally, groups of interconnected neurons which altogether underlie
those behaviors. The notion that behaviors arise from distinct, separate groups of neurons is
Reductionist. And it is intensely popular. Hein et al. (2016) allegedly have found the circuit
for motives, Matthews et al. (2016) have found the circuit for loneliness, Chou et al. (2016;
reviewed by Desban and Wyart, 2016) have found the circuit that “determines who wins or
loses a ﬁght” (Desban and Wyart, p. 42), Zalocusky et al. (2016) identify a group of neurons
for “risk selection” and Kondoh et al. (2016) identify a group of neurons for “an instinctive
fear response in mice”. All of these neural groups are Attneave’s “psychoneural functions” –
effectively, they are Homunculi or the things that Homunculi control.
This notion of neural groups as “psychoneural functions” arises because adding
neuronal “circuits” to other neuronal “circuits” merely creates larger and more-complicated
circuits, whereas adding conscious parts to other conscious parts presumably creates
another conscious part – perhaps even a mind. Therefore, there is a drive to assign
consciousness, in the form of a conscious Homunculus, to the smallest possible units of the
nervous system. Those are usually taken to be individual neurons. In the literature, neurons
have been anthropomorphized; they have been granted human qualities such as
consciousness. This approach eliminates any need to explain how consciousness and a mind
might “emerge” from a mass of neurons. The practice of assigning human qualities to
neurons is so commonplace that an entire companion paper is devoted to examining it
(Nizami, 2017). Note well, however, that Homunculus is traditionally invoked to create the
mind from the brain (more on this below). “Mind” is, however, difﬁcult to conceptually
separate from “consciousness”; the issue will not be debated here. Presently, let us assume
that a necessarily conscious Homunculus would have a mind, which would nonetheless be
traditionally called upon to create a mind (mine or yours) from a neuron or a group of
neurons, perhaps a brain. Such paradoxes as minds being required to create minds reveal
the impossibility of Homunculus and are revisited in the Discussion.
2.2 A physical understanding of Attneave’s verbal description
Attneave (1961) is remarkably vague, perhaps intentionally so. Let us assume that each
“function” involves a system of interconnected neurons. Let us also assume that there are
“Homuncular layers” of functions. A subset of the functions on each layer are controlled by
an external Homunculus, one per layer. Consider the “Top Layer”, having enough functions
(here, “n”) for a “mind”. At Top Layer, there is Top-Layer Homunculus, controlling a
number m< n of the Top Layer functions. Figure 2 illustrates the scheme.
But Top-Layer Homunculus contains (according to Attneave) a sub-Homunculus, here
called Second-Layer Homunculus. It controls l functions, where l < m. Within Second-Layer
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Homunculus is Third-Layer Homunculus, controlling k functions, k< l. Within Third-Layer
Homunculus is Fourth-Layer Homunculus, controlling j functions, j< k [. . .] and so on. The
number of functions controlled by each succeedingly lower-layer Homunculus decreases,
until eventually we reach the Second-to-Lowest Layer (Figure 2), which has b functions
(b  j), of which only two are controlled by Second-to-Lowest Homunculus. Below the
Second-to-Lowest Layer is the Lowest Layer, consisting of only two functions – one that is
controlled by Lowermost Homunculus and one that is not.
3. Analysis: Attneave is wrong
3.1 How do nested Homunculi work as controllers?
If this scheme is indeed what Attneave (1961) intends, then Attneave is dead wrong. Here
is why. Consider what happens if Second-to-Lowest Homunculus hypothetically controls
only two functions, regardless of the number of uncontrolled functions on that layer.
Then, after Attneave (1961), one of those two functions would actually be controlled by
Lowermost Homunculus, leaving Second-to-Lowest Homunculus to actually control only
one function. If, likewise, Third-to-Lowest Homunculus hypothetically controlled only
three functions on its layer, then likewise it would actually control only one function. This
effect propagates upward, such that Top-Layer Homunculus itself actually controls only
one function (in Figure 2, it is function “m”), if the number of functions hypothetically
controlled by each Homunculus at each layer continues to increase by just one. But all of
this contradicts Attneave’s notion that if any Homunculus controls only a single function,
then it does not contain nested Homunculi controlling any other functions. The
contradiction remains, even if we allow the number of functions that a given sub-
Homunculus controls to be incremented by more than one over the number controlled by
Figure 2.
An interpretation of
Attneave’s (1961)
proposed hierarchy of
Homunculi that deal
with “psychoneural
functions” (the boxes)
Reductionism
ad absurdum
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the next-lower Homunculus, or if the number of functions controlled by Lowermost
Homunculus is likewise more than just one.
This argument may be difﬁcult for the reader to follow. Certainly, it is difﬁcult to depict
graphically, using only two dimensions. But its essence is simple: when controllers are
nested, each controller must have the same responsibilities as the others. That is, the
number of “functions” controlled by each controller remains the same across controllers.
This is what Figure 1 illustrates when each controller (i.e. Homunculus) actually controls all
“psychoneural functions” associated with the brain.
In sum, “nested control” obviates the very notion of “control” as something done by a
single “controller” (in contrast to an inﬁnity of controllers), that is, a single distinct neuronal
Homunculus “that ‘decides’, on the basis of activity in receptors and other neurons, whether
to initiate that behavior or not” (Attneave, 1961, p. 778).
3.2 How do nested controllers serve not-nested neurons?
There is another issue. Recall Attneave’s statement (1961, p. 778) that “If a homunculus
exists it must certainly be composed of neurons”. If so, then nesting of Homunculi within
Homunculi implies nesting of neurons within neurons. “Nested” presently means “inside of”.
Now, neurons all have connections to other neurons, or to a sensor cell and another neuron,
such that no neuron (or group of neurons) are actually “nested around” by other neurons or
“nested amidst” other neurons. That is, no neuron is physiologically isolated from other
cells.
How then would a Homunculus composed of neurons be realized physiologically?
Maturana and Varela (1987/1998, p. 162) note that a part of the mammalian visual system
called the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) receives voltage spikes from at least six
different parts of the nervous system within the head (Zeki, 1993). Therefore, as
Maturana and Varela (1987/1998) note, the LGN cannot simply be a “relay station”
between the retina and other mammalian vision-associated nuclei. And indeed, Tibbetts
(1995) notes that the reciprocal properties of the LGN are recognized by Harth (1993), who
attempts to make them crucial to a theory of visual perception. Unfortunately, according
to Tibbetts (1995), Homunculi arise in Harth’s scheme. Another example of a neural
Homunculus comes from Crick and Koch (2005; see the feature by Reardon, 2017). Crick
and Koch (2005, p. 1276) postulate that a substructure of the brain called the claustrum is
“A conductor coordinating a group of players in in the orchestra, the various cortical
regions”. Of course, this “conductor” is just the “central executive” by any other name:
Homunculus.
Complicated reciprocal connections indeed occur in mammalian auditory
neurophysiology (Ehret and Romand, 1997). Among other effects, this potentially
confounds any interpretations of psychophysical data (Nizami, 2012b). Consider such
connectivity, then, in the context of an inﬁnite nesting of Homunculi (Figure 1). Back-and-
forth exchanges of neuronal voltage-spikes between physical groupings of neurons, such
as the LGN and its partners, occur without the neurons being “nested” in the way that a
Homunculus is nested within a Homunculus. Nonetheless, spikes are often imagined as
“information ﬂow” (Whitﬁeld, 1984, among countless others, some of them cited in
Nizami, 2014a, 2015). As such, according to Attneave (1961), Homunculi would “direct” or
“interpret” that ﬂow. Indeed, each “information ﬂow” might conceivably have its own
dedicated Homunculus. Homunculi are imagined as being nested (e.g. Figure 1); but
neurons cannot be inside neurons. How, then, could Homunculi that serve neurons
nonetheless be inside Homunculi?
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3.3 Attneave attempts to substitute one form of organization for another
What Attneave (1961) evidently tries to do and which Dennett (1981) also explicitly attempts
(see Section 6, below), but under a business analogy, is the separation of “commanders” from
their “platoons”. Consider an Army Division, divided into battalions, themselves divided
into regiments, themselves divided into companies, themselves divided into platoons. Each
sub-unit has its own commander; each ultimate platoon-commander takes orders from his
respective company commander and so on up to the level of the lone General who
commands the Division. All of the Division’s physical sub-units are hence groups of soldiers.
When arrayed on the parade ground, these groups are physically adjacent, but they are not
physically nested. Nonetheless, the organization of the Division can be diagrammed on paper
as an organizational nesting, using boxes, with platoons as boxes within their companies
and so on up to the largest organizational box within which all of the soldiers reside, namely
the Division. Likewise, the various commanders are not physically nested, but they
nonetheless form an organizational hierarchy, which could be represented on paper by
nested boxes, but might best be represented by a chain-of-command tree structure (see, e.g.
Feinberg, 2011, for the example of biological cells).
Consider now an inﬁnite nesting of Homunculi. It is indeed a physical nesting. However,
it is also an organizational nesting, not merely an organizational hierarchy. That is, each
Homunculus within the inﬁnite regression depends (for instructions) upon all of the
Homunculi nested within itself. In these respects, the inﬁnite nesting of Homunculi differs
from the organization of military commanders. Nonetheless, if soldiers (possibly including
their commanders too) can be thought of as neurons, then what Attneave (1961) and Dennett
(1981) apparently attempt to do is to replace the classic nesting of Homunculi by the
military-command hierarchy. But such a transformation appears impossible prima facie.
(For example, Feinberg (2011) posits “nested” groups of neurons, but on closer inspection
they appear to be merely adjacent groups.)
Altogether, Attneave’s scheme for the elimination of the inﬁnite nesting of Homunculi
does not work. And yet others (see above) believe in his scheme. They, like Attneave, may be
making crucial errors, perhaps in the form of inappropriate assumptions. It is important,
therefore, to scrutinize Attneave’s assumptions.
4. The source of Attneave’s error: revisiting the traditional inﬁnity of
Homunculi
A crucial assumption underlies the imagined need for the Homunculus. The assumption in
question has been stated already, but bears repeating: namely, that the nervous system of
any species is inherently “stupid”, indeed, that it is useless because it contains only a mass of
neuronal voltage spikes which form “internal representations” of external phenomena.
Those representations are believed to be “stupid” because they lack “sense” or “meaning”.
Lörincz et al. (2002, p. 189) point out the erroneous belief that “an internal representation is
still meaningless unless someone can “read” or interpret it” (original internal quotation
marks) (see also McMullen, 2001). In other words, the erroneous belief is that “the internal
representation should make sense” (Lörincz, 2009, p. 126; italics supplied). Such things as
“sense” or “meaning” allegedly only therefore arise when the spikes are subjected to
“examining”, “remembering”, “knowing” and “deciding” by a Prime Homunculus, to create
an actualmind. Of course, such activities are what already deﬁnes an actual mind – so that a
mind is needed in order to have a mind and so on ad inﬁnitum. This is what is shown by
Figure 1. More is said on this below.
Note well an important point: that each mind-within-a-mind must be equally capable. Even
nested Homunculi within the brain of an insect must achieve the same degree of
Reductionism
ad absurdum
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sophistication as the insect’s Prime Homunculus, even if that Prime Homunculus is less
capable than a human being’s. But Attneave (1961) allegedly escapes the inﬁnity: “We fall
into a regress only if we try to make the homunculus do everything”. Attneave says:
Indeed, one might even hypothesize a series of concentric or nested homunculi without falling into
a regress, provided each contained an outer layer of functions not contained in the next smaller
one.
Effectively, our so-called Prime Homunculus is replaced by a Homunculus of lesser
responsibility and hence less-than-fully-human capability – namely, Top-Layer
Homunculus (Figure 2). Similarly, Top-Layer Homunculus does not fully generate the
human mind; hence, hypothetically, it likewise needs nothing within it to generate a
complete mind – something of yet lesser capability is enough, namely, Second-Layer
Homunculus. The latter, in turn, needs within it something of yet lesser capability still,
namely, Third-Layer Homunculus [. . .] and so on, until a “stupid” Homunculus is reached
that cannot be stupider, namely, Lowermost Homunculus.
Altogether, Attneave (1961) simply ignores the very deﬁnition of Homunculus; after all, if
it does not “do everything”, then what operates the remaining “psychoneural functions”?
Attneave’s (1961) notion of Homunculi becoming progressively “stupider” was to be
replicated by Dennett (1981), as follows.
5. Dennett (1981) and how he claims to dismiss the inﬁnite regression of
Homunculi
5.1 “Brainstorms” by Daniel Dennett: an introduction
In 1981, The MIT Press published a book copyrighted to Bradford Books, Publishers, in
1978. That book was Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, by Daniel
C. Dennett (D. Phil., Oxon.). Dennett’s book is an academic best-seller. It is still in print. It has
been cited more than 4,000 times (GoogleScholar), far in excess of the minimum of 100
citations presently considered to be “signiﬁcant” for a scientiﬁc work. It receives new
citations daily.
5.2 How Dennett (1981) dismisses the inﬁnite regression of Homunculi
5.2.1 Replacing Homunculi by machines. Dennett’s book largely concerns Homunculus.
Nonetheless, Dennett does not get to the crux of his arguments until his eightieth page.
There, he discusses artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), as a context within which to introduce an
assumption that underlies many of his numerous remaining pages. In Dennett’s words, “AI
program designers work backwards on the same task behaviorists work forwards on”
(Dennett, 1981, p. 80). That is, to Dennett, an AI researcher starts with a problem such as
making computers “understand” and then “breaks it [the problem] down into sub-problems”
(Dennett, p. 80). Those sub-problems involve operations such as “recognize”, “distinguish”
or “ignore”. From there, the researcher “breaks these problems down still further until ﬁnally
he reaches problem or task descriptions that are obviously mechanistic” (Dennett, p. 80;
italics added). That is, “The AI programmer [. . .] frankly views the computer
anthropomorphically” (Dennett, 1981, p. 80). Further, “the highest level design breaks the
computer down into a committee or army of intelligent homunculi with purposes,
information and strategies” (Dennett, p. 80; italics added).
Dennett (p. 80) states that “Each homunculus in turn is analysed into smaller homunculi,
but, more important, into less clever homunculi” (original italics). Dennett (p. 80, original
internal quotation marks) elucidates:
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When the level is reached where the homunculi are no more than adders and subtractors, by the
time they need only the intelligence to pick the larger of two numbers when directed to, they have
been reduced to functionaries “who can be replaced by a machine”.
Figure 3 shows Dennett’s hypothetical relation of functions to Homunculi.
5.2.2 Making the machines: the stupidifying of Homunculi. By now, the reader may have
noted some similarity of Dennett (1981) to Attneave (1961). But to continue: Dennett (1981,
p. 81) concludes that “if the [computer] program works then we can be certain that all
homunculi have been discharged from the theory”; that is, “obviated from the program”.
Dennett (p. 101) further notes, “Any psychology with undischarged homunculi is doomed to
circularity or inﬁnite regress”. Dennett’s word “psychology” seems, in context, to mean a
suite of human behaviors, perhaps all of those that characterize a human being (rather than,
e.g. any body-of-thought purporting to provide psychological explanation). Dennett then
proceeds to provide the missing details of his scheme, that is, how to “discharge” all
Homunculi from a “psychology”, viz.: “If one can get a team or committee of relatively
ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculi to produce the intelligent behavior of the whole,
this is progress” (p. 123; original italics). But this is also Attneave (1961). In Attneave, as the
Homunculi are successively nested they assume fewer responsibilities – that is, they get
“stupider”. Oddly, Dennett (1961) does not credit Attneave (1961). Regardless, Dennett now
Figure 3.
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returns to his mind-analogue from artiﬁcial intelligence. He visualizes the mind-analogue
anthropomorphically, as a corporate organization (Dennett, pp. 123-124; original italics):
A ﬂow chart is typically the organizational chart of a committee of homunculi (investigators,
librarians, accountants, executives); each box speciﬁes a homunculus by prescribing a function
without saying how it is to be accomplished (one says, in eﬀect: put a little man in there to do the
job).
Hence, according to Dennett (p. 124):
If we then look closer at the individual boxes we see that the function of each is accomplished by
subdividing it via another ﬂow chart into still smaller, more stupid homunculi.
Dennett continues (p. 124, original internal quotation marks):
Eventually this nesting of boxes within boxes lands you with homunculi so stupid (all they have
to do is remember whether to say yes or no when asked) that they can be, as one says, “replaced
by a machine”.
Of course, “to say yes or no” is to make a decision, something done by the whole human
being. Regardless, Dennett (1981, p. 124) summarizes his model as follows: “One discharges
fancy homunculi from one’s scheme by organizing armies of such idiots to do the work”
(original italics). But Dennett (1981), like Attneave (1961), provides no illustration of his
Homuncular hierarchy. Rather, he provides a number of complicated but seemingly-
irrelevant ﬂowcharts, perhaps to emphasize his aesthetic of mind-as-computer.
5.3 Dennett’s interpretation of Homunculus’ place in physiology
Dennett (1981) also translates his scheme into physiology, speciﬁcally, the visual system.
Dennett declares (1981, p. 124) that “The more raw and uninterpreted the [sensory]
representation – e.g., the mosaic of retinal stimulation at an instant – the more sophisticated
the interpreter or user of the representation”. The “interpreter” presumably is Homunculus,
lying close to the retinal receptors, perhaps as a neuron. Dennett continues (1981, p. 124),
“The more interpreted a representation – the more procedural information is embodied in it,
for instance – the less fancy the interpreter need be” (original italics). In other words, as the
“representation” gets further from the retina and closer to the brain, the less sophisticated is
the respective observing-controlling Homunculus. Dennett (p. 124, original italics) proceeds,
It is this fact [sic] that permits one to get away with lesser homunculi at high levels, by getting
their earlier or lower brethren to do some of the work.
Thereby, “All homunculi are ultimately discharged” (Dennett, p. 124). Dennett presumably
means that Homunculi are reached who are so stupid that they are merely “machines” that
make Yes/No decisions. An army of idiots does the work – but those idiots hypothetically
work more centrally to the brain than the retina does.
Dennett (1981) provides no illustration of his model. Figure 4 shows the present author’s
interpretation. Of course, if Homunculi are neurons, then the order of neuronal sophistication
in Dennett’s scenario is exactly the opposite of what many physiologists and psychologists
have postulated for decades; otherwise, the brain has nothing to do.
6. Analysis: Dennett is wrong
Dennett’s (1981) concept of how to eliminate Homunculi strongly resembles that of Attneave
(1961). And, like Attneave, Dennett proves to be wrong, as follows. Dennett (1981) imagines
a Homuncular committee, each member controlling a function that can be subdivided into
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other functions. Each Homunculus contains less intelligent Homunculi, within them yet-less-
intelligent Homunculi, all controlling functions. Eventually a level is reached at which each
of that level’s Homunculi “can be replaced by a machine”.
But just like Attneave (1961), Dennett (1981) ignores the fact that any Homunculus, by its
very deﬁnition, is inﬁnitely nested with Homunculi of identical capability, whatever that
capability may be. And just like Attneave (1961), Dennett (1981) uses “stupidifying” to redeﬁne
Homunculus, not to remove it. Finally Dennett, just like Attneave (1961), assumes that
Homunculi are neurons; but for neurons, “nesting” is a physical impossibility. Organization-
wise, Dennett (1981) imagines Homunculi as employees within ofﬁces within departments
within businesses. But neuron-wise, such structure is not possible. Indeed, the “stupidifying” of
Homunculus-neurons with rising cognitive level opposes Dennett’s own “committee” scheme, in
which a “higher executive” (e.g. something at the brain) would be expected to be more
sophisticated than an “employee” (e.g. a retinal cell). Compare Figures 3 and 4. The notion that
cognitive “processing” becomes more sophisticated brain-wards was common belief by 1981.
So why did Dennett (1981) postulate that the brain had the stupider Homunculi? The apparent
answer is a paper called “Some informational aspects of visual perception” (Attneave, 1954;
Figure 4.
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3,200þ citations). Attneave (1954, p. 183) approaches perception “as an information-handling
process” which “seems to involve a set of processes whereby information is predigested before
it ever reaches awareness” (p. 187, original italics). That is (Attneave, 1954, p. 189):
It appears likely that a major function of the perceptual machinery is to strip away some of the
redundancy of stimulation, to describe or encode incoming information in a form more economical
than that in which it impinges on the [visual photo-] receptors.
Cue to Dennett (1981), whose sophisticated interpreter “predigests” the “incoming
information” to produce something that is sufﬁciently “economical” for stupider Homunculi,
namely, those whom Dennett implies to be closer to the brain. In short, the work of Dennett
transpires again to be the work of Attneave.
7. Discussion: the mind as computer
7.1 Neuronal “computation”
Dennett’s (1981) approach to eliminating Homunculi is to treat brains as computers. That
analogy is perpetuated by others in the ﬁelds of Philosophy and Psychology. For example,
Margolis (1980, p. 246) asks “What, for instance, are the informational sub-routines
neurophysiologically processed in the brain that facilitate what we call perception [. . .]?”.
Tibbetts (1995, p. 405) likewise asks, “How does simple data acquisition become
transformed into perception?” and speaks of “neural computers” (Tibbetts, p. 407).
Neuroscientists, too, imagine that sensory neurons that provide input to the brain and brain
neurons themselves are computers. Indeed, sensory neurons may “adopt” some sort of
“coding strategy” (Rieke et al., 1997, p. 175). As such, it is “the speciﬁc computations being
performed by the [individual] neuron under study” which must be discovered by the
neurophysiologist, according to Chacron et al. (2003, p. 803; see also Passaglia and Troy,
2004, p. 1229). Neurons have many lab-imagined “coding strategies” to choose from
(MacKay and McCulloch, 1952; Stein, 1967; Walløe, 1970; Optican and Richmond, 1987;
Victor, 2006).
And naturally, the eye’s retina has some such “computational strategy” (Atick and
Redlich, 1992, p. 200). How accurate is it? Bialek et al. (1991, p. 1856) allegedly know, at least
for ﬂies: “The ﬂy visual system approaches optimal real-time computation”. Remarkable!
An animal’s vision may be as good as man-made algorithms! This notion has been seconded
by (among others) Baden et al. (2016, p. 345), as follows: “Information channels from the
mouse eye to the mouse brain” may have “an encoding strategy resembling that used in
state-of-the-art artiﬁcial vision systems”.
These are just a few examples of the computer analogy; the literature is vast. The
computer analogy is likewise applied to neurons deep within the brain; consider, for
example, that “Neurons at higher processing stations may become largely independent to
allow for easier readout” (Chechik et al., 2006, p. 359). Similarly, Ciocchi et al. (2015, p. 560)
declare that some particular part of the brain “computes diverse information” and then
sends “computations transmitted [sic]” to various brain “targets”. Readers are referred to the
companion paper (Nizami, 2017) for further examples of the use of the computer analogy in
the literature.
7.2 Homunculus, the computer programmer
Any present-day computer depends upon a Homunculus – namely, the computer
programmer. The programmer not only designs the computer’s “thinking” (i.e. the software/
program), but provides input (“stimuli” or “data”). The programmer also reads the output, to
reach conclusions (Presumably, so would one or more hypothetical Homunculi within the
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programmer’s own brain, according to Dennett (1981)). Von der Malsburg (2014, personal
communication) notes that “All interesting things like planning, problem solving,
debugging and interpretation happen in the mind of the programmer, not in the computer.
Here the programmer is the homunculus”. If the brain is a computer, then, the programmer
must reside within the brain – in the form of Homunculus. Searle (1994, p. 212) notes of the
literature that “The idea always is to treat the brain as if there were some agent inside it [i.e.
the Homunculus] using it to compute with” (italics added). That is, “Without the
homunculus, there is no computation, just an electronic circuit. So how do we get
computation into the brain without a homunculus?” (Searle, p. 221). Searle (pp. 212-225)
further notes that a model of a neurophysiological process is not itself a neurophysiological
process and need not reveal anything about such a process.
7.3 Homunculus, retriever of memories
As noted in the Introduction, the Prime Homunculus needs a memory to perform
“remembering”, “knowing”, “deciding”, “discriminating” and so forth. In the literature, there
is an awareness of the need to describe human memory without inadvertently invoking
Homunculi (Dalla Barba, 2001; Lörincz et al., 2002; Hazy et al., 2007; among others). But there
is another, closely-related danger, namely, that of confounding human memory with
computer memory. Both of these concerns are inherently noted by von Foerster (2003/2010).
He cautions against viewing human memory as a “document storage and retrieval system”
(von Foerster, p. 103) that involves memory retrieval by a mobile “little demon” (von
Foerster, p. 103), a demon that needs its own memory of where memories were stored, that
is, a Homunculus. Of course, the Homunculus becomes part of an inﬁnite nesting of
Homunculi, namely, the very one shown in Figure 1.
Von Foerster implies that the “demon” arises because scientists confuse the “vehicles for
potential information with information” (von Foerster, p. 103; original italics). That is,
scientists confuse storage media for what is being stored, namely, memories. Von Foerster
(p. 103) further implies that the role of cognition, the job traditionally directed by
Homunculus, should be to “lift” information from its carrier signals (von Foerster’s original
quotation marks). Von Foerster (p. 103) then states his particular aim, namely, to “ultimately
dismiss the demon and put his brain right there where ours is”. That is, von Foerster wishes
to render Homunculus superﬂuous. His proposed method involves neural “memory units”.
But it is unclear whether von Foerster (2003/2010) achieves his goal, as there are too many
missing details, a characteristic of his other chapters in that particular book as well.
Regardless, von Foerster seems to pursue a computer analogy, like Dennett (1981).
Regarding computers and memory, Naka and Sakai (1993, p. 80) might offer the last words
here: “Matter is not information itself, just as chips are essential to a computer but are really
sets of instructions that turn a computer into a computingmachine”.
Such analogies represent Reductionist approaches. Reductionism is of ongoing concern
in cybernetics and for good reasons, as follows.
8. Discussion: Attneave, Dennett and Reductionism
8.1 Attneave (1961) and Dennett (1981) as Reductionists
Reductionism is the attempt to explain a complicated behavior or action, emanating from a
complicated mechanism, in terms of simpler behaviors or actions, emanating from simpler
mechanisms (Nizami, 2017). The Attneave (1961) and Dennett (1981) schemes are
fundamentally Reductionist. Many others follow their lead. Crick and Koch (2000, p. 10)
declare that the “problem of [explaining] consciousness [. . .] needs to be approached in a
reductionist, scientiﬁc manner”. Note well the equating of “scientiﬁc” to “reductionist”, by
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two highly-placed contemporary scientists. Similarly, Monsell and Driver (2000, p. 27) favor
“the progressive fractionation and localization of control subfunctions, through the
combination of chronometric performance analyses, neuropsychology, functional imaging,
electrophysiology and neuropharmacology”. However, they warn that “It remains to be seen
whether, in due course, the control homunculus will turn out to have been merely
fractionated or completely dissolved” (Monsell and Driver, p. 27). They continue: “Although
the picture remains murky, each new result adds a little light and we are beginning to
discern the identities of some recruits to the army of control ‘idiots’” (Monsell and Driver,
p. 28; original internal quotation marks). Of course, those “idiots” are merely Dennett’s (1981,
p. 124) “homunculi so stupid [. . .] that they can be, as one says, ‘replaced by a machine’”.
This is Reductionism, as echoed in Verbruggen et al. (2014, p. 514):
We believe that in order to understand how control is achieved, boxes [sic] have to be broken
down until we understand how complex behavior arises from a basic set of cognitive processes
that can be implemented by our neural system.
Or, as Hommel et al. (2004, p. 103) declare:
Cutting human performance into pieces that are simple enough for us to understand seems to be
the only way to get rid of the homunculi still hiding behind our theories.
The present author would, of course, disagree.
8.2 Margolis (1980) and Sober (1982): how can we “reduce” the “intentional”?
The Reduction favored byMonsell and Driver (2000) and Verbruggen et al. (2014) and others
may not even be conceptually possible. After completing the analysis shown above, the
present author became aware of a critique of Dennett that was published in 1980, based
upon the original 1978 printing of Dennett’s book (see Section 5.1). In the critique, Margolis
(1980) argues in terms of the “intentional”, that is, the “purposive” (Margolis, p. 245), which
involves “ascriptions of real psychological states, conscious and cognitively qualiﬁed”
(Margolis, p. 255). Margolis also uses the words “molar”, referring to the whole human and
“molecular”, referring to its components. In those terms, Margolis states a conclusion that
was eventually reached by the present author (Section 3), namely, that the lowermost
Homunculi, which Dennett (1981) describes as “stupid”, cannot be so: “There remains a
sense in which, in discharging “fancy homunculi”, our “more stupid homunculi” never
actually perform in a way that approaches purely non-intentional functioning” (Margolis,
1980, p. 251; original internal quotation marks). Margolis (p. 251) further declares that:
The only purpose the description [Dennett’s discharging of Homunculi] can serve is to suggest the
fair sense in which intentional molar states and processes may be successfully analyzed into
component intentional states and processes at the molecular level: we can make the components
as numerous and as simple as we please, but (admitting the irreducibility of the intentional and
the reality of intentional states) we are logically constrained to treat the relevant molecular
processing as intentionally or informationally qualiﬁed.
In other words, “Neither he [Dennett] nor we know of any way to reduce the intentional to
the non-intentional” (Margolis, 1980, p. 255).
Or, as McMullen (2001, p. 163) notes under the assumption that “intentionality” requires
“knowing”:
One cannot derive cognitive activities from non-cognitive ones by breaking the former down to
subsets of the latter and this is because the concept of “completely stupid knowers” is self-
contradictory.
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In short, Dennett and his predecessor, Attneave (1961), were blufﬁng. And even if Dennett
(1981) thinks that he can reduce intelligent Homunculi to stupid ones, the crucial detail of
how is absent. Or, as Margolis (1980, p. 254; original italics) puts it,
Dennett’s program makes no sense unless he can show how the conscious and cognitive
capacities of molar agents can be analyzed, without remainder, into the systematically linked
capacities of molecular homunculi.
Note the crucial element without remainder; or, as noted above (Section 4), if an Attneave
(1961) Homunculus does not “do everything”, then what operates the remaining
“psychoneural functions”?
The same point about Dennett (1978/1981) is made by Sober (1982), in a roundabout
fashion. Sober differentiates between “smart” Homunculi and “stupid” Homunculi as
follows: “Smart homunculi [as in the Cartesian theater] may explain why I now see the page
in front of me, but they do not explain what seeing is” (Sober, p. 422; italics added). Seeing is
a sensory mechanism and the Homunculi that explain sensory mechanisms are compelled to
be stupid, so Sober implies. Nonetheless, the intentional cannot be reduced to the non-
intentional. Hence, each nested Homunculus must be as capable as the next, resulting in an
inﬁnity of Homunculi, the inﬁnity of Figure 1. But nesting the Homunculi still does not
explain what seeing is.
The dichotomy of “seeing” versus “perceiving” has long been noteworthy. Kenny (1971)
had warned about the persistence of hidden Homunculi (more on this below). Rorty (1971)
produced a directed retort, in which she criticizes Kenny’s (1971) warnings in a fashion that
is unintentionally ironic (Rorty, p. 78; original internal quotation marks):
It might seem as though Kenny were saying: on the one hand there is a mechanistic account of the
physical states “associated” with seeing. These states can be explained scientiﬁcally. On the other
hand, there is an activity of persons, called “perceiving”, which must be given quite a diﬀerent
sort of explanation.
Rorty declares her disapproval of such a dichotomy. But that dichotomy was our state of
understanding in 1971 and it remains our state of understanding today.
9. Discussion: Kenny (1971), Rorty (1971) and Reductionism
9.1 Kenny (1971) warns of Homunculi
Kenny (1971) focuses on Homunculus, in the context of criticizing attempts by René
Descartes (see citations in Kenny) and by Richard Gregory (1966) to express their own
warnings about “the postulation of a little man within a man to explain human experience
and behavior” (Kenny, 1971, p. 66). Descartes and Gregory are concerned with vision, where
Homunculus hypothetically manifests as a pair of “second eyes”, inside the brain of
whatever creature experiences sight. But Kenny interprets Descartes and Gregory as both
inadvertently invoking Homunculus while they are warning against invoking Homunculus!
Elsewhere, Tibbetts (1995, p. 406) provides one argument against a visual Homunculus at
the brain:
Ironically, only at the retinal level is all the information that will be relayed to diﬀerent feature-
extraction areas [closer to the brain] still intact in one location. If a Homunculus were to be
anywhere, then, it would be sitting just behind the retina.
As for the putative physiological “feature-extraction areas”, those at the brain itself are
described by Zeki (1993), amongst others.
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Kenny (1971) was immediately followed by a retort by Rorty (1971), a retort that
expresses the spirit of Reductionism in neuroscience and perhaps its motivation too, as
follows (Rorty, p. 79):
Someone might hold the extreme view that once we have a really good neuro-physiological
account of the mechanisms of perception, we could tell whether and possibly even what
(although this seems more questionable) a subject has seen by having him wired up
appropriately.
This relates to an important statement made by Gregory (1966) and mentioned by Kenny
(1971, p. 68), viz., “How is information from the eyes coded into neural terms, into the
language of the brain and reconstituted into experience of surrounding objects?”. Kenny
(1971, p. 68) correctly protests that the brain itself does not speak a “language”. But he fails
to dwell upon another important point, namely that Gregory (1966) is talking about
reconstitution of voltage-spikes (from the retina) into percepts – reconstitution, otherwise
known as “reconstruction” or “decoding”. Nizami (2017) explains these terms and notes that
they represent tasks often assigned to one or more anthropomorphized neurons, which
effectively, become Homunculi.
9.2 A weak rebuttal from Rorty (1971): “Homunculus is a metaphor”
According to Kenny (1971, p. 65), invoking Homunculus is “a dangerous practice which may
lead to conceptual and methodological confusion”. Rorty (1971) retorts by dismissing
Homunculus as a “metaphor”, but fails to clearly deﬁne what she means by “metaphor”.
Baddeley (1998) likewise offers the “metaphor” excuse, in place of “metaphor” employing
“useful concept [. . .] [that] does not have to be in any absolute sense “true” or “correct””
(Baddeley, p. 524; original italics and internal quotation marks). But Homunculus is used by
hard-nosed math modelers, who are not accustomed to employing “metaphors” (Oram et al.,
1998; Westover and O’Sullivan, 2008; Seriès et al., 2009). Indeed, in the highly-cited book Spikes
(Rieke et al., 1997), the words “homunculus” or “homunculi” appear at least twenty-two times
just in the last six pages of their Chapter 1, titled “Central Claims of this Book”. Such repeated
attention might be lavished upon a “central claim”, but seems inappropriate for a metaphor. In
response to Rorty (1971), a reader might ask why any metaphor would appear in a scientiﬁc
discourse.
10. Discussion: an alternative to Homunculus: Emergence
Regarding Reductionism, von Foerster (2003/2010) differentiates “hard sciences” from “soft
sciences” according to whether Reductionism “inevitably leads to success” (hard sciences),
or whether (von Foerster, p. 192; original italics and quotation marks):
Scientists are dealing with essentially nonlinear systems whose salient features are represented
by the interactions between whatever one may call their “parts” whose properties in isolation add
little, if anything, to the understanding of the workings of these systems when each [such system]
is taken as a whole.
The latter deﬁnes Emergent phenomena – and also the mind. Consider the following.
10.1 An early-contemporary “simple” deﬁnition of emergence: Goldstein (1999)
In an oft-cited paper, Goldstein (1999, p. 49) deﬁnes “emergence” as “the arising of novel and
coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in
complex systems”. Goldstein considers “complexity theory”, which is a ﬁeld of mathematics,
as central to emergence. In practice, this may not always be the case. It is always the case,
K
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
6:
33
 0
6 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
(P
T)
however, that “Emergent phenomena are conceptualized as occurring on the macro level, in
contrast to the micro-level components and processes out of which they arise” (Goldstein,
p. 49). Of course, this deﬁnition depends upon what are meant by macro, micro and so on;
which, as it transpires, is not always clear. Regardless, Goldstein (p. 50) further characterizes
emergent phenomena as “neither predictable nor deducible from lower or micro-level
components”. Emergent phenomena “appear as integrated wholes that tend to maintain
some sense of identity over time” and they occur “at a global or macro level” (Goldstein,
p. 50). Further, they “arise as a complex system evolves over time” (Goldstein, p. 50). Finally,
they “are recognized by showing themselves”, a concept that Goldstein does not pursue.
10.2 A detailed classiﬁcation of emergence: Fromm (2005)
Goldstein (1999, p. 57) subsequently notes that emergent phenomena are not “reducible to
the parts alone”. Hence, emergence may offer a non-Reductionist, non-Homuncular account
of consciousness. Note well, however, that Goldstein’s well-cited paper oversimpliﬁes
emergence, even despite what was known at the time. Fromm (2005) provides a broader
review. He identiﬁes four forms of “emergence”, depending upon how much feedback and
what types, are associated with emergent phenomena. Now, feedback is a basic aspect of
ﬁrst-order cybernetics (Wiener, 1948) and Goldstein (1999, p. 55) identiﬁes cybernetics as
among the roots of emergence theory. But, according to Fromm (2005), feedback is also an
active aspect of emergence.
Fromm’s (2005) ﬁrst of four forms of emergence is “simple intentional/nominal”, which
involves no top-down feedback from the macroscopic level to the microscopic level. Fromm
gives examples, which include a mechanical timepiece, in which a measure of time emerges
from the movement of gears; and a volume of gas, in which measures called “temperature”
and “pressure” emerge frommolecular motion. Measures, of course, require an Observer; the
Observer’s role is discussed further, below.
Note well that even the primitive ﬁrst level of emergence is important, because we might
try to understand the mind through the mind’s product, technology. Consider the
Antikythera Mechanism, described in the book “Pebbles to Computers” (Blohm et al., 1986).
The Antikythera Mechanism is an ancient, corroded-bronze geared device retrieved from a
shipwreck, a device believed to have indicated the positions of heavenly bodies. Blohm et al.
(1986) refer to the Antikythera Mechanism and similar devices, such as mechanical adding
machines, as “analog computers”. Blohm et al. describe various devices, from the simple to
the complicated and they illustrate how the latter were designed from the former. But the
complicated cannot simply be deconstructed back-down to the simple; too many reﬁning
processes (as in the literal reﬁning of silicon for integrated circuits from “pebbles”) occur in
the build-up stages. The various gears of the Antikythera Mechanism were presumably
designed to work only as an integrated whole and hence would have proven useless when
separated into gear-groups or individual gear-wheels. Likewise, as noted in Section 3, the
integrated whole called “consciousness” might not be divisable into portions that are
directed by (or contain) “sub-Homunculi”working as “pieces of” consciousness.
Fromm’s second form of emergence (Fromm, p. 9) is weak emergence, which involves:
Unpredicted patterns, structures or properties – emergent phenomena – which are not directly
speciﬁed in the interaction laws [which govern the component “entities”] and which in turn
inﬂuence the low-level interactions of the entities via a feedback process.
This is perhaps the “emergence” meant by Goldstein (1999); it is subject to “top-down
feedback” (Fromm, 2005, p. 9), also called “downward causation” (Fromm, p. 9; Goldstein,
1999, p. 62). Downward causation consists of either negative feedback (involved, for
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example, in the swarming of animals; Fromm, 2005, pp. 10-11), or consists of positive
feedback (involved, for example, in stock-market “bubbles”; Fromm, pp. 12-13). Fromm then
names a third kind of emergence, one which is more complicated insofar as it can involve
short-range positive feedback and long-range negative feedback. For this kind of emergence,
Fromm gives the examples of pattern formation in animal coats and the evolution of the
Earth’s ecosystem.
Finally, Fromm (2005, p.18, original italics) reaches his fourth category of emergence,
namely, “strong emergence”:
Strong Emergence can be deﬁned as the appearance of emergent structures on higher levels of
organization or complexity which possess truly new properties that cannot be reduced, even in
principle, to the cumulative eﬀect of the properties and laws of the basic parts and elementary
components.
Fromm names just two “strong emergents”, namely, life and culture. Remarkably, he omits
consciousness. In contrast, the philosopher Chalmers (2006) names consciousness as the only
sure “strong emergent”. Chalmers also distinguishes “strong downward causation”, in
which “the causal impact of a high-level phenomenon on low-level processes is not deducible
even in principle”, from “weak downward causation”, in which such impact is merely
“unexpected” (Chalmers, p. 249).
10.3 Why emergence is a second-order cybernetics concern
Chalmers’ latter deﬁnition begs the question, of course, of what is meant by “unexpected”. And
Chalmers (2006) spends several pages inherently toying with that question. As such, he
indirectly reveals that “unexpected” is relative to our own understanding of a system, that is,
that “unexpected” is subjective (Goldstein’s “are recognized by showing themselves”). But
Chalmers’ term “deducible”, which he uses to distinguish “strong” downward causation from
“weak”, seems likewise to be subjective. All told, what phenomena exemplify which kind of
“emergence” is relative to the expectations and capabilities of the Observer – which perhaps
explains the differences over what phenomena are “strongly emergent”. As such, emergence is,
in itself, a Second-Order Cybernetics concern.
10.4 Evidence for an emergent mind?
We might ask what self-organization would produce integrated wholes that tend to maintain
some sense of identity over time. Such “wholes” include the macro-level (and apparently non-
deducible and non-reducible) phenomenon called Consciousness, perhaps exercising downward
causation. Thompson and Varela (2001) suggest a candidate for self-organization: ensembles of
neurons, neurons whose discharges synchronize locally and globally for a fraction of a second,
providing transient linking of widely distributed parts of the brain. “Downward causation” can
then, for example, be an inﬂuence of intentional mental exercises on neuronal activity
(Thompson and Varela, 2001). However, Thompson and Varela (2001, p. 419) emphasize that
“the available evidence so far regarding synchronization in the vertebrate brain is only
correlative, not causal”. Indeed, anything beyond correlation may be undiscoverable. We might
take this as a deﬁnition of true emergence, so that true emergence represents not merely the
uncomprehended but the incomprehensible.
One ﬁnal note: Winograd and Flores (1987) discuss a stance taken by the philosopher
Heidegger, viz.: “The interpreted and the interpreter do not exist independently: existence is
interpretation and interpretation is existence” (Winograd and Flores, p. 31). In other words,
everything is interaction – requiring an existing world to have thoughts and feelings about.
According toWinograd and Flores (p. 32), Heidegger also claims that our own beliefs cannot be
K
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
6:
33
 0
6 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
(P
T)
fully comprehended, essentially because we are ensconced in them. The present author would
extend the word “beliefs” to that fromwhich they emanate, namely, “brain processes”.
11. Conclusions
The imaginary personage called Homunculus resides within the brain, examining arriving
neuronal spike-trains to infer the state of the internal and external worlds. But Homunculus, by
necessity, is inﬁnitely nested. Attneave (1961) and later Dennett (1981) allegedly remove the
inﬁnity through Reduction. In particular, they attempt to limit the number of Homunculi,
essentially by trivializing them, by rendering them into “stupider” parts. But there is a mild
problem: all such Homunculi still “behave”, that is, they perform things done by the whole
human – even when those whole humans “are no more than adders and subtractors” or when
they merely “pick the larger of two numbers” (Dennett, 1981, p. 80). Behavior is behavior and
therebyAttneave (1961) and Dennett (1981) fail to eliminate Homunculi.
What was the underlying thinking? Nagel (1974) notes (albeit in a very convoluted fashion)
that we expect all subjective experience (e.g. perceptions) to correspond to observable physical
phenomena. Hence, there arose “the effort to substitute an objective concept of mind for the real
thing, in order to have nothing left over which cannot be reduced” (Nagel, p. 445). In other
words, to reduce the “intentional” to the “non-intentional”. But, as Nagel (p. 445) cautions:
If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of
experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could
be done.
Nagel’s words could have been written yesterday. To actually remove the inﬁnity of
Homunculi, the Homunculi need to be rendered irrelevant. Or as von Foerster (2003/2010,
p. 103) puts it, we need to “dismiss the demon [Homunculus] and put his brain right there where
ours is”. Historically, the “little idiots” of Attneave and of Dennett were either neurons or
“controllers” of neurons, which performed tasks – including even automatic unconscious
activities, such as the regulation of breathing – tasks that required “discriminating” (as in
Signal Detection Theory; Green and Swets, 1966/1988), “directing”, “interpreting”, “thinking”,
“examining”, “comparing”, “computing” and so on (Nizami, 2017). But these words describe the
behaviors of the whole conscious human being, not those of the individual neurons (Nizami,
2017). If we regard “discriminating”, “directing”, “interpreting”, “thinking”, “examining”,
“comparing”, “computing” and so on as capabilities that emerge from the activity of the
enormous number of neurons in the brain, then Homunculi ﬁnally become irrelevant.
Meanwhile, Homunculi continue to lurk in scientists’ explanations of cognition. To
remove Homunculi once and for all, the culture of Cognitive Science itself needs to change. In
particular, Reductionism’s limited scope needs to be recognized. That limitation was well-
understood by Dr David Suzuki over 30 years ago: “Our knowledge of how single neurons
work in the brain is of little or no help in treating a psychotic person or coping with
loneliness” (Suzuki, in Blohm et al., 1986, p. 10). And yet, there has been a recent slew of
miraculous Reductionist discoveries of circuits for behaviors (Chou et al., 2016; Hein et al.,
2016; Kondoh et al., 2016; Tovote et al., 2016; Zalocusky et al., 2016), including the
identiﬁcation by Matthews et al. (2016) of the circuit for loneliness! But is this alleged
loneliness circuit of any clinical use? For that matter, should Matthews et al., or anyone else
making such claims, be trusted? After all, as Dr Suzuki notes (in Blohm et al., 1986, p. 11),
“By looking at nature in bits and pieces, our understanding of it can only be fragmentary, for
nature is not the sum of its isolated parts”. This is Nature as an Emergent phenomenon. And
certainly, any brain “circuit” is only one small part of the brain. We can only imagine the
time andmoney that has been wasted on the Reductionist search for neuronal Homunculi.
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